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Abstract
The focus of this paper are Dummett’s meaning-theoretical arguments
against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation.
Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of
increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses
to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that
in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of
the basic assumptions of Dummett’s outlook on the theory of meaning. In
particular, I shall grant Dummett his general bias towards verificationism,
encapsulated in the slogan ‘meaning is use’. The second general assumption
I see no need to question is Dummett’s particular breed of molecularism.
Some of Dummett’s assumptions will have to be given up, if classical logic
is to be vindicated in his meaning-theoretical framework. A major result
of this paper will be that the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of
inference in the Dummettian framework.
Fu¨r die Negation liegen die
Verha¨ltnisse nicht so einfach.1
Gentzen
1 Introduction
Dummett’s meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic are divided
into two kinds.2 One kind comprises arguments based on the nature of
knowing and understanding a language: here belong the manifestability and
the acquisition arguments. These arguments aim to establish that the nature of
speakers’ understanding of a language does not warrant the assumption that
every sentence is determinately either true or false. It is widely agreed that
1‘The situation is not so easy for negation.’ (Gentzen 1936, 511)
2This paper has been with me for a while. Many people have read or heard versions of it and
contributed with their comments. Instead of trying to list them all, which would undoubtedly
lead to unintended omissions, I’d like to single out two philosophers to whom I am particularly
indebted. Bernhard Weiss, to whom everything I know about Dummett can be traced, and Keith
Hossack, my Doktorvater, for his robust philosophical challenges. This paper would not have been
written without their advice and encouragement. I would also like to thank the referees for Grazer
Philosophische Studien, whose constructive criticism resulted in a substantial improvement of this
paper.
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they are either unsuccessful3 or too underdeveloped to carry the force they are
intended to carry—the latter point being attested to by Dummett himself, who
admits that it is far from a settled issue what full manifestability amounts to.4
The other kind comprises arguments based on how the meanings of the
logical constants are to be determined in the theory of meaning. They are the
focus of the present paper. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three
such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by
giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classicist5.
It is crucial that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not
challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett’s outlook on the theory
of meaning. In particular, I shall grant Dummett his general bias towards
verificationism, encapsulated in the slogan ‘meaning is use’. The second
general assumption I see no need to question is Dummett’s particular breed of
molecularism. The point of the present paper is to investigate how, accepting
these Dummettian assumptions, the classicist can counter Dummett’s arguments.
Some of Dummett’s assumptions will have to be given up, if classical logic
is to be vindicated in his meaning-theoretical framework. I will argue that
the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference in the Dummettian
framework.
As Dummett’s project is well known, the discussion of his views on the
theory of meaning remains deliberately concise.
2 tertium non datur
2.1 Against tertium non datur
Dummett rejects holism, the view that the meaning of a word is determined by the
whole language in which it occurs, as well as atomism, the view that the meaning
of a word can be determined individually. In received terminology, the principle
of compositionality states that the meaning of a syntactically complex expression
depends on the meanings of its constituent expressions and the way they are
assembled. Dummett argues for a more substantial principle, which he calls by
the same name. ‘The principle of compositionality is not the mere truism, which
even a holist must acknowledge, that the meaning of a sentence is determined
by its composition. Its bite comes from the thesis that the understanding of a
word consists in the ability to understand characteristic members of a particular
range of sentences containing that word.’ (Dummett 1993, 225) The notion of
complexity on which a molecular theory of meaning is built cannot be equated
with syntactic complexity, but characterises semantic features of expressions.
There are expressions an understanding of which requires an understanding
of others first. For instance, whereas understanding the terminology of the
theory of the colour sphere presupposes an understanding of colour words, the
converse is not true: a speaker may be proficient in using colour words like ‘red’,
‘green’, ‘yellow’ and ‘blue’ without understanding the terms ‘pure’, ‘mixed’ and
3Transposing Alexander Miller’s arguments from the semantic realist to the adherent of classical
logic (Miller 2002, 2003).
4Cf. the ‘Preface’ to (Dummett 1991).
5In defiance of the OED, where ‘classicist’ is reserved for persons who study Classics or followers
of Classicism, I shall use this term to refer to adherents of classical logic.
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‘complementary colour’ or what is meant by ‘saturation’, ‘hue’ and ‘brightness’.
The latter expressions are semantically more complex than the former. As
Dummett puts it, a relation of dependence of meaning holds between them.
‘What the principle of compositionality essentially requires is that the relation
of dependence between [sets of] expressions and [sets of] sentence-forms be
asymmetric.’ (Dummett 1993, 223) The qualification ‘sets of’ is needed because
there may be collections of expressions that, although they must form surveyable
sets, can only be learned simultaneously; according to Dummett, this is true
for simple colour words (ibid.). A theory of meaning employs the relation of
dependence to impose on the expressions of the language ‘a hierarchical structure
deviating only slightly from being a partial ordering’ (ibid.). It thereby exhibits
how the language is learnable step by step. In learning a language, a speaker
works his way up the hierarchy from semantically less complex to semantically
more complex expressions. Mastering a stage in this process is to master
everything a speaker needs to know about the meanings of the expressions
constituting that stage, and it does not alter the speaker’s understanding of
the meanings of expressions constituting stages lower in the hierarchy. This is
Dummett’s molecularism in the theory of meaning. To avoid confusion with
received terminology, I shall avoid using ‘compositionality’ where the semantic
notion of complexity is concerned and instead use ‘molecularity’.
Applying molecularity to proof-theory and combining it with the verifica-
tionism derived from the principle that meaning is use, according to Dummett a
proof should never need to appeal to sentences more complex than that which is
proved. It should be possible to transform any proof into one which satisfies this
requirement. A speaker following a proof should always be able to work his way
up from less complex assumptions to a more complex conclusion, where of course
intermediate steps down through less complex sentences are allowed on the way
up. Dummett puts forward the fundamental assumption of the proof-theoretic
justification of deduction: ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement,
we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of
one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator.’ (Dummett 1993,
254) Leaving out the technical details, the fundamental assumption ensures that
we can always construct proofs in such a way that the sentences occurring in
the proof can be ordered by the relation of dependence of meaning, as required
by molecularity, in such a way that the conclusion occupies the highest point in
the hierarchy.6
With this material, Dummett can give a compelling argument against classical
logic on meaning-theoretical grounds. I shall follow traditional terminology and
call A ∨ ¬A tertium non datur, which deviates from Dummett’s terminology. A
6According to Dummett, the fundamental assumption applies not only to arguments which
are proofs, but also to the more general case of deductions with undischarged premises, which,
as Dummett acknowledges, meets some formidable difficulties (Dummett 1993, Chapter 12).
These difficulties are irrelevant to the arguments to be given here, as they only require that the
fundamental assumption applies to theorems, in which case it is provable for intuitionist logic
and some formulations of classical logic. In another paper I argue that, quite independently of the
present considerations, it is best to restrict the fundamental assumption in this way (Ku¨rbis 2012).
Strictly speaking, we should also make a distinction between ‘argument’, ‘canonical proof’ and
‘demonstration’, but this introduces a complexity unnecessary in the present context. Arguments
may contain ‘boundary rules’, which are rules allowing the deduction of atomic sentences from
other atomic sentences, as well as arbitrary inferences (Dummett 1993, 254ff). Canonical proofs and
demonstrations are essentially special cases thereof, formalised in a system of natural deduction
satisfying Dummettian criteria.
3
proof of tertium non datur in the system of classical logic formalised in (Prawitz
1965) proceeds as follows:7
2¬(A ∨ ¬A)
2¬(A ∨ ¬A)
1
A
A ∨ ¬A
⊥
1¬A
A ∨ ¬A
⊥
2
A ∨ ¬A
The proof violates molecularity: the less complex A ∨ ¬A is deduced from the
more complex discharged assumption ¬(A ∨ ¬A). No proof of A ∨ ¬A which
would satisfy Dummett’s criteria can be given. For how should such a proof
of A ∨ ¬A proceed? By molecularity and the fundamental assumption, A ∨ ¬A
would have to be derived from A or from ¬A. Whichever it is, it must come
from assumptions that are discharged in the process of the argument. It cannot
be A, for this may be an atomic sentence and no atomic sentence follows from
no premises at all.8 It cannot be ¬A either, for, if A is atomic, neither does ¬A
follow from no premises at all.9 Hence it is not possible to meet Dummett’s
criteria on molecular theories of meaning and accept A ∨ ¬A as a theorem.10
This argument against classical negation is remarkable. The main assumption
it is based on is that a theory of meaning should be molecular, which is a very
plausible assumption. It is not an argument that Dummett gives himself, but,
being based purely upon Dummettian considerations, it is one that he could
give, in particular as he thinks that double negation elimination or an equivalent
classical negation rule like consequentia mirabilis, from Γ,¬A ` ⊥ to infer Γ ` A,
violate constraints on molecularity. It is an argument that is very strong indeed.11
2.2 A classicist response
The appeal to molecularity in the argument against tertium non datur assumes
that A ∨ ¬A and ¬(A ∨ ¬A) are of different semantic complexity. It is a fair
question to ask—whether one is a classicist or not—what it is that a speaker
needs to understand in order to understand ¬(A ∨ ¬A) that she does not need
to understand in order to understand A ∨ ¬A. On the face of it, there is nothing
7I’ll discuss various ways of formalising classical logic in Prawitz’ system in due course and
show what is wrong with them on the Dummettian plan. We can exclude ways of formalising logics
that Dummett excludes, such as multiple conclusion logics.
8If A is not something like verum, but it is clear enough how the point is to be taken.
9If A is not something like falsum, cf. the previous footnote.
10For special areas of enquiry one may be able to show that either A or ¬A, as is the case in
intuitionist arithmetic for atomic A. However, this is not a question of logic: it makes assumptions
concerning the subject matter of the atomic sentences, and logic makes no such assumptions.
11It rules out even logics in which negation is conservative over the positive fragment, such as the
relevant logic R. According to Belnap, responding to (Prior 1961), conservativeness is a requirement
for the existence of a constant (Belnap 1962, 133f). This is not sufficient to ensure that the constant
is a respectable one on Dummett’s account, as other meaning-theoretical constraints have to be
satisfied, too. Hence someone following Peter Milne’s suggestion of viewing consequentia mirabilis
as an introduction rule for A still needs to answer Dummett’s molecularity constraint, as Milne
himself notes (Milne 1994, 58f). The present paper can be seen as providing Milne with a solution to
this problem.
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in one that is not in the other. To understand A ∨ ¬A and ¬(A ∨ ¬A), one needs
to understand ¬, ∨ and that A stands for a sentence. Dummett introduces
two notions of complexity: syntactic complexity, related to what is normally
called the principle of compositionality, and semantic complexity, his notion
of molecularity. The two notions do not coincide. For the argument against
tertium non datur to go through, it has to be assumed that the fact that ¬(A∨¬A)
contains A ∨ ¬A as a proper subformula, and is therefore syntactically more
complex, carries over to their respective semantic complexities. I shall argue
that this assumption is unmotivated.
Consider what Dummett says is involved in understanding ‘or’. ‘On a
compositional [i.e. molecular] meaning-theory, to know the meaning of ‘or’, for
example, is to be able to derive, from the meanings of any sentences A and B,
the meaning of pA or Bq [. . .] To understand pA or Bq, therefore, you must (i)
observe the composition of the sentence, (ii) know what ‘or’ means, (iii) know
what A and B mean.’ (Dummett 1993, 222) Decompositing clauses (ii) and (iii)
in the cases of A∨¬A and ¬(A∨¬A) end in the same final components: in each
case you need to know what ∨, ¬ and A mean.
Arguably, clause (i) does not impart semantic complexity either. I cannot just
observe the composition of a sentence in the abstract, as it were: understanding
the composition is essentially tied to an understanding of the parts and how
they are pieced together. To understand ∨, I need to understand that it takes
two sentences and forms a sentence out of them. I also need to understand
the principles of inference governing it. As there are two introduction rules
for ∨, my understanding guarantees that I understand that the order of the
sub-sentences plays a role in the composition, even though the two options are
logically equivalent. As another example, take ⊃: understanding this connective
involves understanding that it forms a sentence out of two sentences and the
rules of inference governing it. The latter guarantee that my understanding
also involves an understanding that the meaning of the resulting sentence is
different depending on which sentence I put to the left and which one to the
right of ⊃. How to compose sentences with these constants is an essential part
of understanding them. It comes together with an understanding of what ∨ or
⊃mean that they put together sentences in a certain way, which results in the
sentences having a certain composition.
In addition, the meanings of the logical constants are given in a completely
general way. Concerning the understanding of logical constants, Dummett
writes that ‘the understanding of a logical constant consists in the ability to
understand any sentence of which it is the principal operator: the understanding
of a sentence in which it occurs otherwise than as the principal operator depends
on, but does not go to constitute, an understanding of the constant.’ (Dummett
1993, 224) The rules governing it tell us how to proceed when the constant
applies to any sentences whatsoever. If I understand an operator and can apply
it in one case (e.g. ¬A), I can also be expected to be able to apply it in any
other case (e.g. ¬(A ∨ ¬A)), given I understand the rest of the context, which ex
hypothesi is so in the case of tertium non datur, as ∨ is understood. Of course we
need to observe how the components are pieced together. But in piecing them
together in one way or other, no new conceptual resources are required.
Following this line of reasoning, the classicist can point out that in fact the
proof of tertium non datur does not violate molecularity. The difference in the
syntactic complexity between A ∨ ¬A and ¬(A ∨ ¬A) does not carry over to the
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semantic level. Exactly the same conceptual resources are needed to understand
either of them.
Thus the classicist has a straightforward response to the Dummettian argu-
ment against tertium non datur. It proceeds entirely on Dummettian grounds,
appealing only to principles that Dummett himself puts forward. It has the
further implication of revealing the fundamental assumption to be an excessive
requirement, if, as Dummett demands, it is applied strictly to the main operator
of a theorem.
The phenomenon that syntactic complexity doesn’t carry over to semantic
complexity is more widespread than just the logical constants. Consider ‘Fred
paints the wall in complementary colours’. This is syntactically less complex than
‘Fred paints the wall in red and green, or blue and orange, or purple and yellow’.
However, it is semantically more complex, as I cannot understand the concept
‘complementary colour’ without understanding simple colour words. Similarly,
Dummett suggests that ‘child’, ‘boy’ and ’girl’ are expressions that occupy the
same point in the partial ordering that dependence of meaning imposes on the
expressions of the language. They can only be learnt together, where some
logical relations between them need to be recognised as well (Dummett 1993,
267). If this is so, then, even though it is syntactically more complex, ‘Hilary is a
boy or a girl’ is semantically as complex as ‘Hilary is a child’.
2.3 Conclusion
Although unsuccessful, the Dummettian argument against tertium non datur is
significant as it is an attempt to formulate an argument against classical logic
purely on the basis of very general considerations about the form a theory
of meaning has to take. It relies on the assumption that the difference in the
syntactic complexity between A∨¬A and ¬(A∨¬A) carries over to the semantic
level. The classicist can respond by denying that this is so.
The classicist response is not based on any specifically classical principles. In
particular, it makes no reference to the fact that classical logic does not need ∨
as a primitive, which the Dummettian can counter by arguing that as ordinary
language has an undefined ‘or’, logic should have ∨ undefined, too. The core
and motivation of the classicist response can be accepted by philosophers of
any logical bias. The argument against tertium non datur aims to establish that
something is wrong with classical logic, if the framework of a Dummettian
theory of meaning is assumed. The classicist response does not proceed by
establishing that something is wrong with Dummett’s favourite, intuitionist
logic, but only that the argument fails to show that something is wrong with
classical logic: we have not been given good reasons to believe that classical
logic does not fit into the Dummettian framework.
Philosophy being what it is, straightforward arguments and simple responses
won’t settle the issue. In the next section, I shall give a second Dummettian
argument against classical negation that aims to establish that negation in
general does add to the semantic complexity of sentences, and I shall provide a
corresponding classicist response.
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3 Classical negation rules
3.1 Against rules yielding classical negation
The Dummettian argument against tertium non datur focussed on a specific
application of classical negation rules. The classicist response counters that this
application cannot be objectionable on Dummettian grounds. The Dummettian
should now focus more generally on the effect of rules that, when added to
intuitionist logic, yield classical logic.
To illustrate the line of argument, assume classical logic is formalised by
adding double negation elimination to intuitionist logic with the following rules
for negation introduction and elimination and ex falso quodlibet:
i
A
Ξ
⊥
i¬A
¬A A
⊥
⊥
B
I’ll discuss other ways of extending intuitionist to classical logic in due course.
To establish that these rules violate general constraints imposed on the
theory of meaning, the Dummettian needs to point out that there are sentences
B not containing negation which can be established as true only by using double
negation elimination, such as Pierce’s Law ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ A) ⊃ A. Then the inference
of B from ¬¬B would, on Dummettian principles, be constitutive of the meaning
of B, because it licenses uses of B that are not possible independently of this
move. Hence the meaning of B would depend on the meaning of ¬¬B. But there
is a component in ¬¬B the meaning of which has to be acquired independently
of B, i.e. negation. To acquire an understanding of the meaning of negation, a
speaker needs to acquire an understanding of the rules of inference for negation,
which he doesn’t have to know in order to know B. This is a case where syntactic
and semantic complexity go hand in hand. For the Dummettian, ¬¬B counts
not only as syntactically more complex than B, but also as more complex in the
semantic sense. Thus by molecularity, the meaning of ¬¬B is dependent on the
meaning of B and negation. This is a circular dependence of meaning: a speaker
who wishes to command an understanding of B would first have to command
an understanding of ¬¬B, which, however, cannot be achieved independently
of mastery of the meaning of B. A speaker could not break into the circle and
learn the meaning of B. B could have no place in the partial ordering that
the relation of dependence of meaning imposes on the language. Hence B
cannot have a stable meaning at all. It follows that double negation elimination
should be rejected, as it is incompatible with Dummett’s molecularism and his
interpretation of the principle that meaning is use.12
12It is worth reflecting whether there are examples of non-logical sentences not containing negation
that can only be verified by double negation elimination, if classical logic is used, i.e. whether the
non-conservativeness of classical negation over the positive fragment of intuitionist logic applies
also to non-logical sentences. Maybe the following is an example. Consider an embryo. Let’s call it
Hilary. An intuitionist would resist the temptation of asserting that Hilary is either a boy or a girl, as
neither disjunct can yet be verified. But consider ‘Hilary is neither a boy nor a girl’. Intuitionistically,
this is equivalent to ‘Hilary is not a boy and not a girl’. But an intuitionist might accept that if a
child is not a boy, then it is a girl: arguably, verifying that a child is not a boy just is or must proceed
via verifying that it is a girl. Hence if Hilary is neither a boy nor a girl, Hilary is a girl and not a girl,
which is impossible. Hence, the intuitionist can conclude that it is not the case that Hilary is neither
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In deriving a problematic sentence A of the kind we are interested in, double
negation elimination need not be applied in the final step, so that the whole
sentence to be derived is its conclusion. It may instead be applied to deduce
a proper subsentence B of A. There will then still be a sentence that, in the
process of the deduction, can only be derived by deriving its double negation
first. What affects the part affects the whole: A cannot have a stable meaning if
its subsentence B does not have one. Moreover, such a proof of A can always be
transformed into one in which double negation elimination is the final step, and,
for reasons to be explained later in this section, they both have to count equally
as canonical verifications, and the problem that affects the one affects the other.
It is clear that what applies to double negation elimination equally applies to
other rules for classical negation. The observation at the basis of the argument
against double negation elimination—that there are sentences B not containing
negation that can only be verified by applying double negation elimination—
generalises. As classical negation is not conservative over the positive fragment
of intuitionist logic, any rules for classical negation will enable us to derive
sentences not containing negation using sentences containing negation. The
Dummettian observes that, if classical negation rules are employed, there are
sentences A not containing negation that can only be verified by a process that at
some point appeals to the negation ¬B of a subsentence B of A (not necessarily
a proper subsentence). To understand ¬B a speaker needs to understand
something he does not need to understand in order to understand B: negation.
Classical negation rules affect the use of B, as they affect the conditions under
which it is assertible, and thus its meaning. This, once more, produces a circular
dependence of meaning, just as in the case of double negation elimination.
There are other ways of extending intuitionist logic to classical logic than
adding double negation elimination. We could add rules for implication, such
as Pierce’s Rule:
i
A ⊃ B
Π
A
i
A
This rule violates molecularity. If A can only be verified by appeal to this rule,
then the application of the rule would be constitutive of its meaning. But A ⊃ B
occurs in an undischarged assumption, so a speaker applying the rule needs to
understand that sentence in order to be able to do so. However, the meaning of
A ⊃ B depends on the meaning of A. Again, there is a circular dependence of
meaning between A and A ⊃ B.
If negation is defined in terms of⊥ and ⊃, Peirce’s Rule generalises a classical
negation rule:
i¬A
Π
A
i
A
a boy or a girl. The classicist would proceed to apply double negation elimination to conclude that
Hilary is either a boy or a girl, even though there is no direct verification of the sentence. If this is
plausible, then ‘Hilary is either a boy or a girl’ is an example of a sentence which, if classical logic is
used, can only be verified by verifying its double negation first.
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Even keeping ¬ primitive, the special case is no improvement on the general
case: if A can only be verified by appeal to that rule, then the meaning of A is
dependent on the meaning of ¬A, which appears in an undischarged premise,
and conversely, ¬A is dependent on the meaning of A. Again there is a circular
dependence of meaning. The same counts for consequentia mirabilis:
i¬A
Π
⊥
i
A
Another strategy is to add dilemma:
i
A
Π
B
i¬A
Σ
B
i
B
Here the situation is slightly more complicated, but essentially the same. Any
deduction that ends with an application of dilemma can be transformed into
one that appeals to ¬B:
2
B
2¬B
1
A
Π
B
⊥
1¬A
Σ
B
2
B
The case we are interested in is where the final application of dilemma was part
of a canonical verification of B. The transformed deduction contains a formula,
¬B, that the original one did not contain, and it contains additional applications
of negation introduction and elimination. However, both deductions employ
exactly the same conceptual resources. To follow the original proof, the speaker
needs to understand negation. So he understands ¬B, as the understanding of
negation, being a logical constant, is general. For the same reason, the additional
applications of rules for negation only draw on resources the speaker who can
follow the original deduction already needs to command. The transformed
deduction may contain a maximal formula, if¬A is the major premise of negation
elimination in Σ. It can be removed: the conclusion of the rule will be ⊥, and
we can move the deduction leading to the minor premise on top of A in Π. If
there is no such deduction, the case is trivial. The resulting deduction is still
a deduction of B via ¬B. Thus there is no reason not to count the transformed
deduction also as a canonical verification of B. Dummett does not require that
every sentence has at most one canonical verification. Quite to the contrary.
Understanding a sentence involves a grasp of the wealth of conditions under
which it counts as conclusively verified. Each derivation must count as equally
constitutive of the meaning of B, and once more we have a circular dependence
of meaning, where B depends on ¬B, but ¬B depends on B.
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We can generalise dilemma with the following rule:13
i
A ⊃ B
Π
D
i
B ⊃ C
Σ
D
i
D
A deduction that ends in an application of this rule can be transformed into one
in which D is a subformula of a discharged assumption:
2> ⊃ D >
D
2
D ⊃ C
1
B
A ⊃ B
Π
D
C
1
B ⊃ C
Σ
D
2
D
Instead of >, we could use an arbitrary, but suitably chosen tautology, say
D ⊃ D. We could, indeed, also replace >with other suitably chosen sentences,
in particular sentences E such that the meanings of sentences occurring in the
original deduction depend on the meaning of E in the partial ordering that
dependence of meaning imposes on the sentences of a language in a molecular
theory of meaning. As in the case of dilemma, the transformed deduction
uses exactly the same conceptual resources as the original deduction. Maximal
formulas arising from the transformation can be removed. If the former was
a canonical deduction of D, so is the latter. We get a circular dependence
of meaning: D depends on C ⊃ D, which in turn depends on D, violating
molecularity.
Adding corresponding axioms instead of rules cannot make a difference to
the situation, as they are equivalent. Besides, axioms, according to Dummett,
count as introduction rules. They introduce grounds for asserting sentences
that are not matched by the consequences of asserting them, as laid down
by the elimination rules for the main connective of the axiom. Axioms, then,
immediately violate Dummett’s verificationism.
In this section, I have only discussed specific cases of rules. It would be
desirable to establish a general result to the effect that any rules that yield
classical logic, when added to intuitionist logic, violate molecularity. The cases
discussed are, however, the most prominent ones and are sufficiently varied to
shift the burden of proof. Once more, we can describe Dummett as formulating
a challenge: find rules that yield classical negation that won’t violate general
constraints on the theory of meaning. For the present purposes, we can leave
matters here. I shall go on to discuss a classicist response to the concerns of the
present section that will exonerate the classicist from answering this renewed
challenge.
13We get dilemma by replacing A with > and C with ⊥. Deleting A ⊃ gives yet another rule that
yields classical negation. It is unacceptable to the Dummettian for similar reasons as the general
version.
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To finish, here is a conjecture for a formal result that I leave for another
occasion: A deduction Π ending with an application of a rule that yields classical
logic can be transformed into a deduction Π′ of the same conclusion with the
following properties: a) Π′ finishes with an application of the same rule as Π; b)
the conclusion of Π′ occurs as a proper subformula of a discharged premise; c)
only rules applied in Π are applied in Π′; d) formulas in Π′ not occurring in Π are
composed of subformulas of formulas occuring in Π. The idea is the following.
For introduction and elimination rule to be in harmony, they need to fulfil certain
constraints. The resulting logic is intuitionist. To extend it to classical logic,
rules need to be added that discharge assumptions containing logical constants,
an option Dummett excludes (Dummett 1993, 297). Given further constraints
on such rules, a general procedure can be specified that transforms deductions
in the desired way. Thus any such rule violates molecularity.
3.2 Another classicist response
To counter the argument against rules yielding classical logic, it suffices to argue
that classical negation rules do not, in fact, violate molecularity. What is needed
is a further assumption, one that is very plausible from the classical perspective,
but not inherently classicist: although ¬A is syntactically more complex than
A, this does not carry over to the crucial semantic notion of complexity at the
foundation of Dummett’s molecularism.
Peter Geach has proposed a view on negation which has the desired conse-
quences. Geach holds that an understanding of negation and an understanding
of affirmation14 cannot be separated from each other. A speaker cannot un-
derstand Fa without understanding ¬Fa and conversely: ‘they go inseparately
together—eadem est scientia oppositorum.’ (Geach 1972, 79) Following Geach, I
shall use ‘predicate’ to mean not a predicate letter, but a meaningful expression
of a language, or alternatively ‘concept’. Someone understanding a predicate
needs to be able to distinguish between things to which it applies and things to
which it does not apply. Understanding a predicate enables a speaker to draw
this distinction. Thus understanding a predicate endows a speaker with a grasp
of affirmation as well as negation. Consequently, ‘the understanding of “not
male” is no more complex than that of “male”.’ (ibid.) To grasp a concept is
inseparable from grasping its negation, as ‘knowing what is red and what is
not are inseparable.’ (Geach 1971, 25) A speaker cannot acquire a grasp of one
without acquiring a grasp of the other: they are learnt together. Hence, according
to Geach, a sentence and its negation are of the same semantic complexity.15
Geach’s view on affirmation and negation is comparable to Dummett’s view
14Affirmation is not to be confused with assertion, which is a speech act. Historically, ‘position’
has also been used to denote the opposite of negation.
15Although Geach puts his point in terms of predicate negation, it carries over to sentential negation
and was certainly intended to do so. This is particularly clear in the present context, as Dummett
and, according to his interpretation, Frege would call ¬Fξ the negation of the predicate Fξ only in
a derivative way. Strictly speaking, there is no predicate negation, according to Frege/Dummett.
Negation is a function, and functions always have objects as values, whereas predicate negation
would take functions as values (Dummett 1981, 40ff). ¬Fξ is not constructed from Fξ by applying
negation, but in the same way as every predicate: from a sentence by omitting some occurrences of
a name: from the sentence Fa we omit the name a to get the predicate Fξ, we apply negation to the
sentence Fa to get ¬Fa and drop a from it to get the predicate ¬Fξ. In the final analysis, any talk of
predicate negation is explicable in terms of sentential negation.
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on simple colour words. According to Dummett, in order to understand the
meaning of ‘red’, e.g., I also need to understand other simple colour words, like
‘brown’, ‘green’ and ‘yellow’. Geach makes the analogous point about a predicate
and its negation: to understand ‘red’ requires understanding of ‘not-red’ and
vice versa. Combining Dummett’s and Geach’s points, to understand what it
means that something is red or green or blue etc., I also need to understand that
what is green is not red etc. Saying what something is, is also saying what it is
not, or as Spinoza says: omnis determinatio est negatio.
It is worth noting at this point that saying that Fa and ¬Fa go inseparately
together is one thing, rejecting the claim that ¬Fa exhibits a composite structure
quite another. Geach should not be understood as claiming the latter. Even if
negation is as fundamental to understanding as affirmation, it makes a uniform
contribution to sentences in which it occurs, and ¬Fa may still be described as
being composed of ¬ and Fa. Geach’s point is only that in this case syntactic
composition does not add to semantic complexity.
If the classicist adopts Geach’s account of negation, there is an answer to the
molecularity challenge posed by the argument against rules yielding classical
negation. If negation and affirmation go inseparately together, then diagnosing a
difference in the complexities of A and ¬A relies on a misconception: it is wrong
to measure their semantic complexity by observing that one contains a sentential
operator in principal position that the other lacks. As a speaker acquires
an understanding of both simultaneously, the same conceptual resources are
required in understanding A and understanding ¬A. Transposing Geach’s
ideas to the Dummettian molecular theory of meaning, A and ¬A occupy the
same position in the partial ordering that dependence of meaning imposes
on a language. Thus they have the same semantic complexity. If the sense
of an expression is something a speaker has to know about the expression in
order to be able to use it, then a theory of meaning along Geach’s lines would
specify simultaneously the senses of A and its negation ¬A. Correspondingly,
establishing ¬A as true is an operation of the same complexity as establishing
A as true. Consequently, the argument against classical negation rules loses
its force: a verification of B that proceeds via ¬B does not result in a circular
dependence of meaning, and hence unintelligibility, even if B does not contain
negation and cannot be verified otherwise.
This completes the classicist response to the Dummettian argument against
rules yielding classical negation. There are, however, no obvious reasons why
Geach’s view on negation should be restricted to the classicist. It is quite neutral.
An intuitionist might accept it, too. The point that a sentence and its negation
are of equal semantic complexity can be motivated independently of which rules
negation is subject to. Initially at least, Geach makes no reference to classical
logic.16
16This is not affected by Geach’s illustration of his view, an obvious reference to Frege’s metaphor
of concepts with sharp boundaries (Frege 1998, Vol. II: §56): ‘A predicate may be represented
by a closed line on a surface, and predicating it of an object be represented by placing the point
representing the object on one or other side of this line. A predicate and its negation will then
clearly be represented by one and the same line; and there can be no question of logical priority
as between the inside and the outside of the line, which inseparately coexist.’ (Geach 1972, 79)
According to this picture, ¬¬A has the same content as A. This view is not needed to counter the
molecularity challenge. Geach notices that the picture is problematic for vague predicates. It is only
an illustration and not essential to Geach’s philosophical point.
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3.3 Conclusion
The argument against classical negation rested on the observation that, if classical
logic is used, there are sentences not containing negation that can be verified
only by a process that appeals to rules yielding classical negation, and that
this leads to a violation of molecularity, due to the nature of those rules. The
classicist response rested on the assumption that a sentence and its negation
are of equal semantic complexity. This may be controversial. But as with the
classicist response to the argument against tertium non datur, although this
assumption is particularly attractive for classicists like Geach, it is not one that
actually depends on any specifically classicist assumptions. An intuitionist
could adopt it, too.
The next Dummettian argument I shall consider aims at establishing that the
negation of a sentence must be semantically more complex than the sentence
itself. It differs from the argument against tertium non datur and rules yielding
classical negation in that it not only attempts to show that something is wrong
with classical logic, but also that intuitionist logic is the right logic.
4 ex falso quodlibet
4.1 Negation according to Dummett and Prawitz
The two Dummettian arguments against classical logic given so far fail to
establish the desired conclusion that something is wrong with classical logic.
Dummett needs a more forceful argument using more resources than just general
constraints on the theory of meaning. The argument I shall turn to now is based
on a very substantial additional theory, the proof-theoretic justification of deduction.
Its core tenet is that the meanings of the logical constants, and thus negation, are
to be defined by rules of inference governing them. It is an argument which not
only is intended to point towards a deficiency in classical logic but also aims to
establish that intuitionist logic is the correct logic.
Dummett argues that the meanings of logical constants should be given
by self-justifying rules of inference governing them. To exclude connectives
like Prior’s tonk, these rules are required to be in harmony. For the present
purposes, I do not need to go into the details of Dummett’s account and can
remain fairly informal about this notion.17 Dummett demands that there be
harmony between the canonical grounds of an assertion of a sentence with a
main connective ∗ and the consequences of accepting it as true. Molecularity
plays a role in motivating harmony: learning the meaning of logical connectives
does not affect the meanings of expressions you have already learnt (nor, indeed,
does what you have already learnt affect their meanings). Dummett claims that
if the procedure of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction is followed, the
meanings of the logical constants are given independently of a notion of truth
that prejudges issues between classicists and intuitionists. The logic which turns
out to be the justified one is the correct logic.18
17I give formally precise definitions of harmony and stability in (Ku¨rbis 2013), which work by
specifying how to read off introduction from elimination rules and conversely.
18For details, cf. (Dummett 1993, chapters 11-13).
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Dummett argues that the negation operator should be defined in terms
of implication and falsum, ¬A =def. A ⊃ ⊥, as considerations of rules for an
undefined negation operator show. There are two common options for the
introduction rule. The first option is that ¬A follows if A entails a contradiction:
i
A
Π
B
i
A
Ξ
¬B
i¬A
It can hardly be claimed that the meaning of negation is defined by this rule:
negation is already used in the premises.19 Dummett himself employs a rule
which suffers from the same inadequacy (Dummett 1993, 291ff):
i
A
Ξ
¬A
i¬A
A more promising option is to employ the introduction rule that ¬A may be
derived if A entails falsum:
i
A
Ξ
⊥
i¬A
⊥ is governed by ex falso quodlibet, where B may be restricted to atomic formulas:
⊥
B
Negation introduction is harmonious with the rule ex contradictione falsum,
needed for a complete account of negation:
A ¬A
⊥
An attempt at defining the meaning of negation in terms of the last three rules is
unacceptable. The rules define the meaning of negation in terms of falsum, and
the meaning of falsum in terms of negation: the rule for negation elimination
is also a rule for falsum introduction, and the rule for negation introduction is
also a rule for falsum elimination. Using these three rules leads to a circular
dependence between the meanings of negation and falsum. Dummett argues
that there should be no such circular dependence between the meanings of
the logical constants (Dummett 1993, 257). Hence this is not a viable option
for defining the meaning of negation by rules of inference in the Dummettian
framework.
We are left with Dummett’s option of defining ¬A as A ⊃ ⊥, where ⊥
is governed solely by ex falso quodlibet and ⊃ by its usual introduction and
19Nonetheless, together with ex contradictione quodlibet as the elimination rule for negation, a
system can be formulated in which deductions normalise.
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elimination rules. Different arguments can be given why ex falso quodlibet
satisfies the criterion of harmony. Prawitz argues that it is harmonious with
the empty introduction rule (Prawitz 1979, 35). Dummett likens falsum to a
universal quantifier over atomic formulas (Dummett 1993, 295). The details
need not concern us here. What is important is that the negation so defined is
intuitionist, not classical. Thus intuitionist logic is the correct logic according to
Dummett’s proof-theoretic justification of deduction.
Following this line of argument, classical negation can be excluded, as it
requires the rule consequentia mirabilis:
i¬A
Ξ
⊥
i
A
As already discussed, this rule cannot be used to define the meaning of negation
in terms of falsum, as it cannot count as defining the meaning of falsum indepen-
dently of negation. It presupposes negation, which may occur in discharged
premises. Consequentia mirabilis could only count as defining the meaning of
falsum in terms of negation. But Dummett argues that the meaning of negation
has to be defined in terms of falsum. Hence, once more, employing consequentia
mirabilis produces a circular dependence of the meanings of falsum and negation.
Dummett concludes that intuitionist negation does and classical negation does
not satisfy the criteria of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction.20
It follows that the negation of a sentence is always semantically more complex
than the sentence itself. A ⊃ ⊥ is in general semantically more complex than
A on anyone’s account, as at least for some atomic propositions, a speaker can
understand A without understanding ⊃. Hence Dummett is in a position to
claim that Geach’s view that a sentences and its negation are of equal semantic
complexity must be rejected in favour of a view on which A is less complex than
¬A.
4.2 The classical plan of attack
The rules governing classical negation do not fit the restrictions that Dummett’s
and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction imposes on the form of
self-justifying rules of inference. The classicist may, however, question whether
this gives good reasons for rejecting classical logic. Dummett’s and Prawitz’
argument relies on the assumption that the meaning of negation can be defined
by rules of inference. In the next section, I shall argue that this assumption is
incorrect. Ex falso quodlibet fails to confer its intended meaning on ⊥. Hence the
meaning of intuitionist negation cannot be defined by rules of inference either.
But then nothing can be amiss if the same is true for classical negation and its
rules.
If rules of inference are not understood as completely determining the
meaning of the constant they govern, then there is no rationale for requiring
that they satisfy the demands of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction.
For instance, as rules of inference alone are not sufficient to define the meanings
20The discussion of the previous section contains the material necessary to exclude other ways of
extending intuitionist logic to classical logic in a similar way.
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of the connectives F and P with intended interpretation ‘It will be the case that’
and ‘It has been the case that’, tense logic is not subject to the proof-theoretic
justification of deduction. The fact that the rules and axioms for P and F do
not satisfy its requirements in no way shows that there is something wrong
with them. The rules governing a connective are subject to the restrictions that
the proof-theoretic justification of deduction imposes on the form of rules of
inference if and only if the meaning of the connective is to be defined purely by
the rules of inference governing it. Thus the fact that classical negation rules
do not satisfy the criteria of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction is
insignificant when it comes to reasons for rejecting classical logic.
4.2.1 The meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference
Consider what ⊥ is intended to be: a sentence that is false under any circum-
stances. Reading off its meaning from the rules governing it, the result should
be that we cannot but say that ⊥ is false. Although this characterisation of ⊥
appeals to semantics, it does not violate the intended semantic neutrality of
the proof-theoretic justification of deduction. It is legitimate to appeal to our
semantic knowledge in order to see whether we have reconstructed it correctly
in a given meaning-theory. Looking from the outside, as it were, at someone
using⊥ according to the rule ex falso quodlibet, are we bound to say that he cannot
mean anything but a false sentence with it? The requirement that no semantic
assumptions enter the theory is fulfilled in this case, as no such assumptions
enter the rule ex falso quodlibet. The question is: does it do the job it is supposed
to do?
I think not. The intuitive content of ex falso quodlibet may be explained as
follows: it says about ⊥ something like ‘If you say this, you might as well say
anything’. ⊥ is intended to be the ultimate unacceptable sentence, because
everything follows from it. But what is it that makes a sentence from which
everything follows unacceptable? It is that we assume that there are some
sentences which are false.21 If ‘anything’ covered only true sentences, there is
nothing absurd in a sentence that entails that you may as well say anything.
But it is a contingent feature of language that some sentences are false. Nothing
prevents the atomic sentences of the language of intuitionist logic from all being
true, and in that case every sentence, atomic and complex, would be true. Under
these conditions, ⊥ could be true. So ex falso quodlibet does not give the intended
meaning to ⊥, as it is not the case that we cannot but say that it is false.22 More
precisely, if every atomic sentence of the language was true, then far from ⊥
having to be false, it might be true. If all we know about ⊥ is what ex falso
quodlibet tells us, then for all we know ⊥might be equivalent to the conjunction
of all atomic sentences, and if they are all true, ⊥would be true.23 So there are
circumstances under which ⊥may be true, namely if all atomic sentences are
21Some philosophers might prefer the view that what is unacceptable about a sentence from
which everything follows is that there is no such thing. As they won’t accept Dummett’s and
Prawitz’ views on how negation should be defined, we may exclude them from consideration.
22In section 4.3.2 I argue that the lack of an introduction rule for ⊥ does not remedy this.
23Dummett acknowledges the possibility of all atomic sentences of a language being true (Dummett
1993, 295). He also appears to countenance that complex sentences not containing negation can be
logically true (Dummett 1993, 266ff). This suggests that maybe he envisages a solution along the
lines of section 4.3.1 below, which, however, I shall show not to be workable.
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true. So we are under no necessity to say that ⊥ is always false.24
Ironically, the reason why the definition of the meaning of falsum via ex
falso quodlibet is appealing is that implicitly it appeals to different models for
the language. This smuggles in semantic assumptions. It assumes that ⊥ is
interpreted as having the same truth-value under every interpretation. This
is not something that could be got from the rule. It is an assumption about
how the semantics of ⊥ is to be given, which is external to the rule and thus
illegitimate in the present context: it would not be the rule alone that determines
the meaning of ⊥.
Dummett faces a predicament. He argues that from the proof-theoretic
perspective, the meaning of negation needs to be given in terms of ⊥. But for
ex falso quodlibet to confer on ⊥ the meaning of a constantly false sentence, the
‘anything’ it stands for would need to cover some formulas containing negation,
it being understood that A and ¬A are never true together. So the meaning of ⊥
can only be given with reference to negation. This is circular.25
The classicist and the intuitionist are consequently in exactly the same
situation with respect to their attempts at defining the meaning of negation
proof-theoretically. Dummett claims that the use of consequentia mirabilis, the
rule specifying the use of both falsum and negation in classical logic, engenders
a circular dependence of meaning between negation and falsum, and it now has
been established that the same can be said about intuitionist negation.26
I conclude that the meaning of negation cannot be defined purely proof-
theoretically by rules of inference in the Dummettian framework. Consequently,
if Dummett’s proposal is that the meaning of a logical constant can be defined
purely in terms of its use in deductive arguments if and only if this use can
be characterised by harmonious introduction and elimination rules, then he
is wrong. Even though in intuitionist logic falsum is governed by harmonious
rules, its meaning cannot be defined by these rules. Only the only if part holds.
There are logical constants the meaning of which cannot be determined by the
harmonious rules governing them.27
24This argument occurred to me several years ago. I had to discover that other people found it
as well, in particular (Hand 1999). Milne makes the related point that any deduction of a negated
sentence relies on negated premises or discharged hypotheses. He concludes that ‘it is quite
impossible for ¬-introduction to determine the meaning of ¬’ (Milne 1994, 61). The argument has
its full force, however, only if it is placed in the larger context in which it is produced here, because
of the multi-layered nature of Dummett’s argument against classical logic: even if the meaning
of negation cannot be defined proof-theoretically, some response is needed to the molecularity
challenge. Incidentally, an analogous argument purporting to show that the intended meaning of >
cannot be given by rules of inference has a rather less clear status. > has only an introduction rule,
but no elimination rule, which specifies that it follows from every sentence. In a language which
contains just > and atomic sentences, where all atomic sentences are false, > could be false. But any
language can be extended to contain logical constants defined by rules of inference, in particular ⊃.
Then there will always be true sentences in a language.
25A designated absurdity like 0 = 1 instead of ⊥ makes no difference. It is hard to see how ex
absurdo quodlibet might then be justified, if not because one already accepts ex contradictione quodlibet
and uses 0 = 1 as inducing a contradiction, which is again circular. This works at best in special
contexts like arithmetic where 0 = 1 does the job it is supposed to do due to the axioms of arithmetic,
hence not purely due to rules of inference governing it. In section 4.3.1, I argue that a more mundane
absurdity like ‘a is red and green all over’ does not do the trick either.
26In R there is even less of a chance of defining the meaning of negation in terms of rules of
inference: the relevant falsum constant f is not governed by any rules which are not also negation
rules. At the very outset it must be assumed that we either understand relevant falsum or negation.
27According to Gentzen, ex falso quodlibet has a Sonderstellung amongst the rules of inference: ‘it
does not belong to one of the logical symbols, but to the propositional symbol [⊥]’ (Gentzen 1934,
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4.2.2 Consequences for the theory of meaning
The ingenious idea of Dummett’s proof-theoretic justification of deduction can
be characterised as follows. On the basis of the assumption that speakers can
follow rules of inference and a concept of truth, which is neutral in the sense that
none of its logical properties are specified prior to an investigation into which
logic is the correct one, the proof-theoretic justification of deduction defines the
meanings of the logical constants, amongst them negation. The resulting rules
for negation then settle the question which properties truth has. As these rules
are intuitionist, the principle of bivalence is not fulfilled. Only positive notions
are appealed to as the primitive notions of the theory of meaning, viz. truth,
assertion, affirmation, but not negative ones, like falsity, denial and negation.
Assuming both notions of truth and falsity as basic would prejudge issues
between classicists and intuitionists, because each will assume these notions to
stand in their favourite logical relations to each other. The classicist will assume
notions of truth and falsity that satisfy the principle of bivalence, whereas the
intuitionist will assume notions which don’t. The proof-theoretic justification of
deduction was designed to settle the debate between classicists and intuitionists
on neutral grounds. The choice of primitives, truth and rules of inference, rather
than truth and falsity, was supposed to ensure this neutrality.28
The definition of the meaning of negation in terms of rules of inference fails.
The attempt turns out to be circular. In proof-theory, just as we assume that
the meanings of the atomic sentences of the language are given, we need to
assume that the meanings of their negations are given, too. The main insight to
be drawn from the present discussion is that positive as well as negative primitive
notions are needed in the theory of meaning. The argument of the last section
once more suggests Geach’s view on negation, so that speakers’ understanding
of the meaning of negation is an additional primitive of the proof-theoretic
justification of deduction.
If the meaning of negation cannot be given purely by rules of inference, its
rules are of a different nature from the rules of those connectives where this
is possible. In the latter case, we can give the rules governing a constant from
scratch, so to speak: a speaker can be taught the concept by being taught the
rules. Just as we must assume prior understanding of ‘It will be the case that’ and
‘It used to be the case that’ in formalising tense logic, as learning the rules and
axioms of tense logic are not sufficient to impart this understanding on a speaker,
we must assume that we possess the concept of negation prior to formalisation.
Laying down rules of inference for negation builds on this understanding.
Although the rules tell us something about the intended interpretation of the
symbol, they cannot impart understanding of the concept formalised.29
189). Adopting this view cannot help Dummett and Prawitz, as the question remains where our
understanding of ⊥ comes from.
28The point can also be made by noting that, if truth and falsity are chosen as primitives,
intuitionists and classicists need to say something about the relation between the two notions, e.g.
that nothing can be both true and false. This relies on using negation in the metalanguage, as in ‘If A
is true, A is not false’. Arguably, the negation of the object language will then mirror the properties
of negation in the metalanguage, and hence, because classicists and intuitionists will each use their
favourite logic in the metalanguage, neither has given a neutral justification of logical laws.
29Milne may have something similar in mind, when he says that its rules ‘characterise’ negation
(Milne 1994, 85). Restricted to negation, it is in line with the views of Arthur Prior, who argued that
inferential relations and truth-tables are devices of ‘putting people on the track of the meaning of
a word’ and ‘can help us in this way to fix the meaning of a word’: they are a piece of ‘informal
18
4.3 Three counter-arguments refuted
A Dummettian who’d rather not assume an understanding of the meaning of
negation as a primitive might attempt to modify the proof-theoretic justification
of deduction as a response to the argument that the meaning of negation cannot
be defined by rules of inference. In the following, I shall discuss three accounts
that attempt to do so. I shall show that each of them, though possibly interesting
in their own rights, fails to satisfy Dummettian strictures imposed on the
proof-theoretic justification of deduction.
4.3.1 The nature of atomic sentences
One retort is to claim that Dummett’s atomic sentences cannot be atomic in
the sense of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Wittgenstein 2003, 6.3751) and of formal
logic, where they are independent of each other and no conjunction of atomic
formulas is always false and no disjunction of them is always true. If ⊥ is to do
its job, amongst Dummett’s atomic sentences there must be some that exclude
each other and cannot be true together. Surely this is supported by ordinary
language, where there are such mutually exclusive atomic sentences, say ‘a is
red’ and ‘a is green’. Then falsum could not but be false, as it entails mutually
exclusive atomic sentences.30
At a first glance, this looks like a natural way out. However, it defeats its
purpose. To adopt this approach is in fact to admit that the proof-theoretic
definition of the meanings of the logical constants fails in the case of negation,
as it is obviously not a purely proof-theoretic definition. Proof-theory is not
concerned with what the atomic sentences of a language are like; any collection
will do. That the amendment is spurious is also seen if we consider that if
it was adopted it would be a matter of luck that we have a language with a
decent negation. Couldn’t it be that a language is as the Tractatus claims it to be
and lacks mutually exclusive sentences? Thus even if it is granted that some
languages may contain mutually exclusive sentences, there are circumstances
under which⊥ need not be false, namely if a language fails to have this property.
Far from solving any problems for Dummett and Prawitz, it should evoke
Frege’s comments on Mill’s gingerbread arithmetic: ‘wie gut doch, dass nicht
Alles in der Welt niet- und nagelfest ist’ (Frege 1990, 9); how convenient indeed
that our language is such that it contains the sentences it does in fact contain, as
otherwise we couldn’t do logic properly.
Rhetoric aside, one might of course try to advance arguments that for some
reason or other there must always be true as well as false sentences in a language,
or that a language could not be as Wittgenstein would have it in the Tractatus, or
at least that any language could always be extended in such a way as to contain
mutually exclusive sentences, or that the meanings of sentences are propositions
and there are true ones and false ones amongst them. I have already mentioned
that according to Dummett, using truth and falsity both as primitive fails to
meet his requirements. Quite generally, the amendments just suggested cannot
ensure that the meaning of negation can be defined by rules of inference. They
all leave proof-theory and rely on assumptions external to it. One might object
pedagogy’ (Prior 1964, 160 & 164).
30This was my initial reaction when I found the argument of section 4.2.1. (Tennant 1999) also
proposes it in reply to (Hand 1999).
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that if molecularity as a principle motivated by the philosophy of language may
enter the proof-theoretic justification of deduction, then why not also let other
theses shape the theory, like the ones just mentioned, which maybe could also
be argued for in the philosophy of language? This question misses the point
that there is a crucial difference between molecularity and these further theses.
Molecularity is a principle that enters the form of the rules. Contrary to that,
these further theses affect their content. But the content was precisely what was
to be determined exclusively by the rules. Hence no matter how well these theses
might be established in the philosophy of language, making them an essential
part of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction has the effect of letting the
theory collapse.
Although the ‘amendments’ to Dummett’s theory mentioned in this section
may very well be interesting new approaches to defining the meaning of negation,
they are in fact not amendments at all, but incompatible with Dummett’s approach.
4.3.2 Falsity and assertibility
Another attempt is to argue that the intended meaning of ⊥ is captured by
the rules governing it, as ⊥ is governed by an elimination rule only and no
introduction rule. So it has no grounds for its assertion. Hence there are no
conditions under which it may be correctly asserted, hence under which it is
true. So it can only be false.31
First, this a non sequitur and still does not guarantee that ⊥ is indeed always
false. Although being always false is a sufficient condition for something not
to have grounds for its assertion, this is not necessary. That something has no
grounds that warrant its assertion does not entail that it is false. It could be that
we cannot assert it because we cannot put ourselves in a position to assert all
the premises it relies on. No one would claim that the conclusion of the ω-rule
is always false.
Secondly, the attempt is of no use in the present context. An intuitionist
could be perfectly happy with the claim that ex falso quodlibet determines the
meaning of ⊥ completely. On an intuitionist understanding of falsity, if it can
be proved that something has no warrant, then it is false, and nothing is easier
than showing that this holds for ⊥, as it has no introduction rule. The problem
is that this reasoning presupposes the anti-realist’s notion of truth, explained in
terms of assertibility. That something is unassertible entails that it is false only
given the anti-realist notion of truth. Hence if this line of thought were used
in the explanation of the meaning of falsum, it would certainly not be true of
intuitionist logic that ‘its logical constants can be understood, and its logical
laws acknowledged, without appeal to any semantic theory and with only a very
general meaning-theoretical background.’ (Dummett 1993, 300) An analogous
way would obviously be open to the classicist, using his preferred notion of
truth. No explanation of the meaning of ⊥ that satisfies the requirements of
the proof-theoretic justification of deduction in being semantically neutral is
forthcoming.32
31Cf. (Prawitz 1979) and (Read 2000, 139).
32Appeal to warrants is not in itself biased towards intuitionism. Read describes himself as giving
an account of the meanings of the logical constants in terms of what warrants an assertion of a
complex formula with the constant as main connective (Read 2000, 130). He proposes infinitary rules
for the quantifiers (ibid., 136ff). If Read’s notion of a warrant was an anti-realist one, it would follow
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4.3.3 Empty succedents
Maybe the argument put forward to show that the meaning of negation is not
definable in Dummett’s way asks for the impossible, given the framework he
chose for formalising logic: if an arbitrary B is said to follow from⊥, fair enough,
⊥might be true. But isn’t this shortcoming easily rectified if, instead of B, we
allow an empty space to occur?33 To explain validity in the modified natural
deduction framework, we adopt a suitable modification of an explanation of the
validity in sequent calculi, where multiple and empty conclusions are allowed:
a sequent Γ : ∆ is valid if, whenever all of Γ are true, some of ∆ are true. Surely
then, if from ⊥ only emptiness follows, it must be false.
No doubt, this reasoning towards an always false ⊥ is unassailable. The
only problem with it is that it has the cart before the horse in the context of
the proof-theoretic justification of deduction. The explanation of the validity
of sequents is a semantic one: an inference is valid if it is truth-preserving. On
Dummett’s view of the matter, the proof-theoretic justification of deduction
must forswear the use of semantic notions in defining validity and instead define
it in proof-theoretic terms: harmonious rules are self-justifying and valid purely
by virtue of their form. That these rules are truth-preserving is a consequence
of harmoniousness. The explanation of the validity of sequents does not fit
with Dummett’s outlook and, indeed, makes the proof-theoretic justification
of deduction a rather idle pursuit. Without it, there is again no guarantee that
interpretations of the language on which falsum is true are excluded, even if
empty spaces are employed.
5 Conclusion
To sum up the dialectics of this paper, the argument against tertium non datur
was intended as an argument that appeals only to very general considerations
about the form a Dummettian theory of meaning has to take. It assumes that
there is a difference in semantic complexity between A ∨ ¬A and ¬(A ∨ ¬A).
The classicist can respond by pointing out that this assumption is unwarranted,
as the same conceptual resources are required to understand each of them. The
argument against rules yielding classical negation is an attempt to improve
upon the situation by making a further assumption: that there are negation-free
sentences B the double negation of which is true. Then the rules for classical
negation licence uses of B not otherwise licensed, which results in a circular
dependence of meaning, contradicting Dummett’s requirement of molecularity.
This argument assumes that¬B is semantically more complex than B. A classicist
can counter by arguing that a sentence and its negation should count as being
of the same semantic complexity, as their understanding requires the same
that we can assert the negation of every universally quantified sentence. The assumption that ∀xFx is
assertible would entail a sentence which is never assertible, namely that we have checked an infinite
number of sentences Fti , understood as an actual, completed infinity, for otherwise we could not
proceed to draw the conclusion. Analogously for existentially quantified formulas. Read’s notion of
a warrant needs to be understood in a realist sense: for some warrantedly assertible sentences it is
not within our powers to obtain those warrants. Read does not give a neutral justification of classical
logic, but a rather unsurprising one on the basis of a realist notion of warrant, which is hard to
distinguish from a realist notion of truth. Similar remarks apply to Hacking, who also recommends
infinitary quantifier rules (Hacking 1979, 313).
33As suggested in (Tennant 1999).
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conceptual resources on the part of the speaker. Adopting Geach’s view of
negation, A and¬A occupy the same position in the partial ordering dependence
of meaning imposes on the expressions of a language in a molecular theory of
meaning. The Dummettian response is an attempt to establish that the negation
of a sentence is indeed semantically more complex than the sentence itself. The
argument is based on the proof-theoretic justification of deduction and aims to
achieve two things: first, ¬A needs to be defined as A ⊃ ⊥, which is undeniably
more complex than A, and secondly, only intuitionist but not classical negation
is governed by rules of inference satisfying the requirements imposed. The
classicist response is to point out that the meaning of ⊥ cannot be defined by
rules of inference in the Dummettian framework, and hence the meaning of
negation cannot so be defined either. Thus the fact that the rules for classical
negation do not fulfil the requirements of the proof-theoretic justification of
deduction does not warrant its rejection. I conclude that Dummett has not
formulated a fair objection to classical logic on the basis of considerations about
the form a theory of meaning has to take.
The classicist responses to the Dummettian arguments do not challenge the
meaning-theoretical assumptions of Dummett’s programme, molecularity and
the principle that meaning is use. They do not appeal to any assumptions which
are specifically classical, such as a realist notion of truth. The responses prejudge
no issues between classicists and intuitionists. No charge of circularity can be
put against them.
The strength of the classicist line of defence is also its weakness. Nothing
in the proposed answers to the Dummettian challenges suggests that classical
logic has to be preferred over intuitionist logic. An intuitionist can accept all the
assumptions made in the classicist responses. The Dummettian programme,
modified in the light of the fact that the meaning of negation cannot be defined
proof-theoretically by adopting negation as a primitive notion along Geach’s
lines, is logically rather more neutral than Dummett had thought his original
project to be: it is compatible with both classical and intuitionist logic. I shall
leave the question what conclusions to draw from this for another occasion.
6 Appendix
I argued that Geach’s view on negation suggests itself as a supplement to
the proof-theoretic justification of deduction, so that negation is an additional
primitive on the same par as affirmation. There is a promising alternative
approach that shares the insight that positive as well as negative primitives are
needed. Huw Price has suggested that sense should be specified in terms of two
primitive speech acts, assertion and denial, where negation can be defined in
terms of them.34 The difference is important enough: Price suggests to double
pragmatic primitives, I suggest to double semantic ones.
I omitted bilateralism in the main part of this paper, as it is reasonably far
removed from Dummett’s original framework and deserves consideration on
its own rights. At the request of several readers, I add this appendix to say
a few words about Price’s and Rumfitt’s approach. I discuss them in detail
34See (Price 1983), (Price 1990), (Price 2015). (Smiley 1996) and (Humberstone 2000) follow up some
of Price’s ideas. (Rumfitt 2000) calls the position bilateralism and provides a formal development of
a logic for assertion and denial.
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in two separate papers. To avoid giving away too much of their content, I’ll
restrict myself to summarising results established there. There is, however, an
independent point to this appendix, namely to indicate that it is preferable to
leave the ‘unilateral’ framework of proof-theoretic semantics as it is and adopt
the two primitives affirmation and negation rather than change the framework
to one in which the primitives are assertion and denial. Even if we accept that
negation is a primitive, that doesn’t mean we can’t say anything interesting
about it, so towards the end I also say a few words about how I envisage an
account of negation to proceed.
Most philosophers accept Frege’s view that there is no need to posit a
primitive force of denial (Frege 1918, 153). We cannot understand certain
inferences, such as those where the minor premise is rejected and the major
premise is a conditional with a negated antecedent, in terms of a force of denial,
as a speech act cannot be embedded into a conditional. We need negation
as a sentential operator. But then denial is redundant, as we can define it
in terms of negation and assertion. Price’s and Rumfitt’s accounts are more
complicated than the unilateral account. It seems as if bilateralism only succeeds
in introducing needless complexities.
Bilateralism and unilateralism aren’t, however, equivalent theories, according
to Price and Rumfitt. They aim to meet a well-known Dummettian challenge:
to provide a framework for a theory of meaning that justifies classical logic but
does not suffer from the shortcomings Dummett claims such an approach must
face, by ensuring that it provides for a notion of sense intelligible to the kind
of speakers that we are. Even Dummett and his most ardent followers, I think,
agree that it would be preferable if classical logic were the justified one. Price
and Rumfitt claim that bilateralism succeeds in justifying classical logic, whereas
unilateralism does not. If that is correct, then the complexities of bilateralism
are justified, as they result in establishing a theoretical desideratum, namely the
justification of classical logic.
In two papers on bilateralism, one on Price and one on Rumfitt, I argue
that each approach fails to justify classical logic as the unique logic. Price’s
account, ironically, works better for intuitionist logic. In a similar vein, it is
possible to formulate an intuitionist bilateral logic in Rumfitt’s framework in
which the rules are harmonious, just as they are for classical logic. Thus the
complexities bilateralism introduces into the debate fail to serve their purpose
of justifying classical logic as the unique correct logic. This means that the
unilateral approach of the current paper is to be preferred over their bilateral
approach on methodological grounds.
In the paper on Price, I regiment Price’s account by formulating axioms that
capture the concepts Price employs in his argument that bilateralism justifies
classical logic. Price proposes a pragmatic account of belief in terms of the
differences they make to speakers’ actions. My formalisation shows a certain
amount of redundancy in the concepts Price employs. It turns out that the
axioms entail consequences about the notion of making a difference that Price
can’t accept: if classical logic is correct, the notion is either vacuous or highly
problematic. As my axiomatisation follows Price’s wording very closely, it
cannot be argued that the result merely shows my axiomatisation to be wrong.
I show how a very small modification—adding a ‘not’ at a place in an axiom
characterising disbelief where one would expect one anyway—insures that the
notion of making a difference regains its interest. The theory is then, however,
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best seen as intuitionist, and classical logic cannot be established on the basis of
it. My axiomatisation uses all the resources Price provides, so to get classical
logic, Price needs to extend his account. This may of course be possible, and
I consider Price’s options, but all this establishes is that both alternatives are
possible, not what Price had intended to show, namely that only the classical
version is justified.
Rumfitt poses the intuitionist a challenge: to provide a bilateral account
of intuitionist logic in which the rules of the system are in harmony. Rumfitt
demands of the intuitionist a specification of what in general follows from the
denied negation of a formula that is harmonious with the introduction rule for
denied negations. Classicists and intuitionists agree that the denied negation of a
formula follows from its assertion. The harmonious elimination rule, according
to Rumfitt, is that the asserted formula follows from its denied negation. This is
only acceptable to the classicist, not the intuitionist. I show how to formulate
different rules that are also harmonious, but result in an intuitionist bilateral
logic. Thus Rumfitt’s challenge is met. This is not the place to go into the formal
details, but harmonious rules for an intuitionist bilateral logic can be formulated
by making a fuller use than Rumfitt himself does of the possibilities offered by
the formal framework of bilateral logics.
As neither Price’s nor Rumfitt’s approach lends itself exclusively to the
classicist, but in each case an intuitionist alternative can be formulated, for
methodological reasons—that a simpler theory is to be preferred over an
equivalent more complex one—it follows that the unilateral approach proposed
in this paper comes out as superior to its bilateral rivals.
Rumfitt’s formalism also faces an independent problem of how to interpret
deductions carried out in it. In Rumfitt’s bilateral logic, the premises, discharged
assumptions and conclusions are supposed to be understood as asserted or
denied formulas. Rumfitt accepts that speech acts cannot be embedded in other
speech acts. Thus, the formulas in Rumfitt’s system cannot be understood as
being prefixed by ‘It is assertible that’ and ‘It is deniable that’, as these are
sentential operators and can be embedded. Rumfitt’s bilateral formalism faces a
fundamental conceptual problem: what does it mean to assume an assertion or
a denial in a deduction? Arguably, this makes no sense, as it is plausible that
making an assumption is a speech act.
Even if the meaning of negation cannot be defined by rules of inference
within proof-theoretic semantics, we can still give an account of it. This is the
aim of another paper of mine. For the purposes of this appendix, an indication
of the general idea should suffice. Just as the meaning of a predicate, say ‘is red’,
cannot be given purely by rules of inference, but the colour red has to figure in
how its meaning is determined, the meaning of ‘not’ has to be given by reference
to something other than rules of inference. Inferential relations may play an
important role in determining the meaning of an expression even if that meaning
cannot be completely determined by rules of inference. The predicate ‘is red’
gets its meaning from the inferential relations is stands in with other colour
terms and what it refers to, the colour red. The structure colours exhibit together
validates inferences such as that what is red is not green. Negation enters the
understanding of concepts that exhibit complex inferential structures, like the
colour words, and thus cannot be understood without a grasp of that structure.
Certain metaphysical consideration may enter the Geachean account, but that
is unsurprising: the relation between affirmation and negation is connected
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to facts about the world. It is the point where metaphysics enters logic. If
the meaning of negation cannot be defined within proof-theoretic semantics,
this means that it loses the purity that Dummett envisaged it to have. It is
important, however, to stay as neutral as possible when it comes to the question
of whether classical or intuitionist negation is the correct one. Another question
to be addressed in my paper is whether, on the basis of my Geachean account of
negation, Dummett’s complaints about multiple conclusion logics can be shown
to be unfounded: this gives a smooth and elegant route to justifying classical
logic. The paper aims to show how, building on Geach’s ideas, a viable account
of negation can be given that fills the gap in proof-theoretic semantics identified
in the present paper, but nonetheless stays true to its spirit.
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